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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the high failure rates of
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) over the last several
decades, despite greater access to data, sophisticated
business intelligence (BI) and data analytics (DA) tools,
and work by industry professionals and academics to
improve outcomes. We explore the possibility that the
representativeness heuristic could play a role, and
specifically, if prior probabilities are being ignored or
discounted in M&A evaluations. We confirm our
hypothesis using a regression discontinuity in time
(RDiT) model and a two-way fixed effects model. By
highlighting the negative consequences of this heuristic
on management decisions, we promote the use of datadriven decision making and the role of analytics in
formulating business strategy.

1. Introduction
As we entered the 21st century, there was a belief
that as data exploded and computing power became
more powerful, Business Intelligence (BI) and Data
Analytics (DA) could dramatically increase the success
rate of operational and strategic decision making (SDM)
[1]. In the business sphere, SDM can be defined as “a
strategic decision which is important, in terms of the
actions taken, the resources committed, or the
precedents set” [2]. These are less frequent than the day
to day operational decisions and are more fundamental
to the overall long-term prospects of the organization.
Businesses pounced on this opportunity. In 2011, a
survey conducted by Bloomberg revealed that 97% of
all businesses with revenues exceeding $100 million
were found to be using some form of analytics [3].
Despite the highly anticipated returns from these
initiatives, results have been disappointing, particularly
in SDM. In 2016, after years of investment and
orientation towards decision making supported by
highly sophisticated BI tools, PwC found that two-thirds
(61%) of business leaders surveyed acknowledged their
companies were not consistently making decisions
guided by data and didn’t consider their own
organizations to be highly data-driven [4]. A year later,
a survey of 2,200 business executives conducted by
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McKinsey revealed that 72% thought bad strategic
decisions were either as frequent as good ones or were
the prevailing type within their organization. So it is
clear that even with investment in technology and
sincere effort, there remains a very large gap between
optimal SDM and the current state of affairs.
One great example of SDM is M&As. M&As have
been a very popular proposition for firms to achieve
strategic objectives and have remained that way for
decades, this is demonstrated in Figure 1. With such
M&A fervor, one could easily draw the conclusion that
M&As are a consistent source of success for
organizations. This is not the case. In November of
1999, a landmark study on M&A failure rates was
published by KPMG. They looked at 700 M&As across
107 companies, mainly large, cross-border deals that
took place between 1996-1998. What they found was
that although many business executives subjectively
classified their M&As as “successful”, when evaluated
by an objective measure such as shareholder value, this
was not the case. In fact, 83% of all M&As reviewed
had either no impact or a negative impact on the
organization [5]. A subsequent review of all the existing
literature on M&As found that failure rates were
between 70%-90% [6]. More recently, the global
consulting firm LEK published findings that showed
60% of all M&As destroy shareholder value [7].

Figure 1. The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions
and Alliances (IMAA, 2020)

These persistent failure rates have compelled
researchers to propose various critical success factors
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over the years, such as project planning, cultural match,
strategic alignment, integration of human capital and
more [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]. A summary
of our literature review on traditional factors
contributing to failure rates can be seen in Table 1. Yet,
even after taking these factors into account, high failure
rates persist.
There has been quite a bit of work done in
Behavioral Economics and Experimental Psychology
that shows humans are afflicted by the use of heuristics,
biases, and intuition when tackling complex prediction
problems [15]. Heuristics, biases, and intuition can be
considered a benefit when making most minor
decisions, like whether to cross the street or not. There
are even some rare cases where the use of day to day
heuristics by experts has been considered central to
business strategy [16]. However, when larger, more
complex decisions are contemplated without significant
time pressure, they are generally considered flaws, and
inhibit optimal outcomes [15].
Table 1. Traditional Factors Literature Review
Summary
Factors
Cultural Match

Source

Valuation of Assets

(KPMG., 1999)
(Christensen et al., 2011)
(Marks, & Marvis, 2011)
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014)
(Bauer, Matzler, & Wolf, 2016)
(Christensen et al., 2011)
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014)
(Baker & Niederman, 2014)
(Christensen et al., 2011)
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014)
(Bauer, Matzler, & Wolf, 2016)
(KPMG, 1999)
(Bruner, 2005)
(Lewis,& McKone, 2016)
(KPMG, 1999)
(Marks, & Marvis, 2011)
(Lewis,& McKone, 2016)
(Bruner, 2005)
(Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006)
(Marks, & Marvis, 2011)
(KPMG, 1999)
(Bruner, 2005)
(KPMG, 1999)
(Garzella & Fiorentino, 2014)
(Bruner, 2005)
(Marks, & Marvis, 2011)
(Christensen et al., 2011)

Poor Communication

(KPMG, 1999)

Departing from Business as Usual

(Bruner, 2005)

Right Goal, Wrong Candidate/Strategic Alignment

Integration of Human Capital

Adequate Due Diligence and Rigorous Process

Making Sure the New Business can be
Managed/Management T eam
Recent Experiences/Overconfidence/CEO Hubris

Project Planning, Meeting the Challenge of Complexity
Finding Synergies
Flexibility for Challenges/Adapt to Change

This research goes beyond traditional factors to
consider if cognitive bias, specifically the
representativeness heuristic, is playing a role in
persistent failure rates. The representativeness heuristic
is a shortcut that the human mind often takes when
assessing if one thing belongs with another. This
shortcut means prior probabilities are often not weighted
appropriately in the decision-making process. This
likely has serious consequences for SDM in business
[15][17][18]. With this lens, we use econometric
modeling to examine the effects of published high
failure rates, which should have served as a strong prior
probability for decision making. Our research question
is as follows:

RQ: Does insensitivity to prior probabilities
negatively impact M&A outcomes?

2. Literature Review
A domain of major cognitive biases, and the focus
of this paper is the representativeness heuristic [19].
This heuristic says that individuals will assess a
subjective probability of an event based on two things:
(1) the degree to which the item is similar in essential
characteristics to its parent population and (2) the
degree to which the item reflects the salient features of
the process by which it is generated [19]. Several
experiments have been conducted to detect this
cognitive bias. Kahneman (2011) talks about an
experiment they did where the following information
was provided: “Steve is very shy and withdrawn,
invariably helpful but with little interest in people or in
the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a
need for order and structure, and a passion for detail.”
The question is then asked of respondents: “Is Steve
more likely to be a librarian or a farmer.” In this example
the qualitative information provided for “Steve” creates
the representation of a librarian. A person who hides in
books, works in a place of silence, and is not required to
use brute force. The description convinces the mind that
Steve must be a librarian; however, that qualitative
information that creates the representation in the mind
is low quality as it relates to making accurate
predictions. For example, there are 20 times more
farmers in the US than there are librarians [15]. These
statistical realities are far more important for making
accurate predictions, given that most professions have a
diverse group of practitioners. There is some evidence
that hiring practices are adversely impacted by biases
such as the representativeness heuristic [15].
A major form of bias that falls within the
representativeness heuristic, with plenty of empirical
support, is “insensitivity to prior probabilities” [20]. For
classification problems it can also be called the “base
rate fallacy” [21]. The distinction is simply the
difference between prediction vs. classification, but the
bias mechanism is the same. This bias means people
underweight or ignore past outcomes or base rates in
making a prediction or classification decision [15][22].
One experiment was conducted where subjects were
shown a personality description, randomly selected
from a group of engineers and lawyers, and asked to
assess whether they were an engineer or a lawyer. In one
condition there were no base rates were provided, in
another the subjects were provided a base rate of 70
engineers and 30 lawyers, and in the last condition the
subjects were provided a base rate of 30 engineers and
70 lawyers. In a sharp departure from what a rational
Bayes model would dictate, all produced similar results,
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the base rates had no impact on the decision-making
process [17]. Additional experiments have shown the
level of insensitivity to prior probabilities or base rates
can be altered by extreme rates, which may be
recognized intuitively as relevant [23][24]. For
example, if a prior probability is 60/40, it is likely to be
discounted or discarded in favor of other, more easily
processed qualitative information. However, if the prior
probability is 95/5, there is some evidence that it may be
recognized and processed as relevant [25][24]. The
presence and behavior of this bias has many
implications for SDM, particularly in decisions like
M&As, where there are complex evaluation processes
in place, but little to no focus on prior probabilities. This
would lead to persistent high failure rates until the
problem is acknowledged, and the process is debiased.
With significant evidence that SDM is corrupted by
cognitive biases, we aim to provide evidence of their
presence in a particular strategic decision, M&As.
Specifically, we look to see if there is behavior change
at the individual or group level when exposed to high
failure rates, which should have an impact on future
decision making and levels of confidence. We will do
this with a quantitative approach using two different
econometric methods and applying them to firm level
M&A data.

The data for this initial analysis came from three
sources. The M&A data came from the Institute of
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances (IMAA). Since
fluctuations by industry are more important to
businesses and economic phenomenon than fluctuations
by country, the data was aggregated across the 14 top
industries by year, from 1985 – 2018. Additional graphs
for M&A trends in both value and number can be seen
in Figures 2 and 3.
There are many factors that can impact M&A
activity. Interest rates, company balance sheets, tax cuts,
technology leading to enhanced efficiency, and more
[27]. Many of these factors are related to the strength of
economic growth. To control for macroeconomic
conditions, economic data for covariates was pulled
from two additional sources. The first economic
covariate, Gross World Product (GWP), is the
accumulated value of all finished goods and services
produced across all countries, measured annually in
billions of USD [29]. This controls for fluctuations in
the world economy and was retrieved from the Statista
(2018) website. The trend of GWP over time from 1990
– 2018 can be seen in Figure 4.

3. Data & Methods
Our hypothesis regarding our research question
(RQ) stated previously is as follows:
Hypothesis: As new information is introduced
showing higher failure rates in M&As than
previously known, decision makers’ attitudes
toward M&As will remain stable, demonstrating
insensitivity to prior probabilities.
To test our hypothesis, we use a quantitative
approach. Given the availability of rich, publicly
available data, we begin with a Sharp Regression
Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) model [26] on publicly
available data from the Institute for Mergers,
Acquisitions and Alliances (IMAA) as a preliminary
test. Given the preliminary evidence we found regarding
the apparent presence of insensitivity to prior
probabilities in M&A decision making, we then
acquired a much larger data set from Bloomberg and
analyzed it using a two-way fixed effects model. Both
of these data sets were supplemented with control
variables from various sources based on domain
literature.

3.1 Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT)

Figure 2. M&As in Billions (USD) by Industry (1985 –
2018)

Figure 3. M&As (Total Number) by Industry (1985 –
2018)

The second economic covariate, taken from the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) website, was the
years that have been flagged as a “global recession” by

Page 5112

the following IMF definition: “years where the global
GDP rates of growth were at 3% or less” [30]. There
were 9 years of global recession 1990-1993, 1998,
2001-2002, and 2008-2009. This covariate specifically
controls for recession level downturns where we might
see a sharp drop in M&A activity. We limited economic
controls to these two given the availability of highquality data at the global level.
The method used for this analysis is a Sharp
Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) model [26].
The analysis was conducted with Stata software. RDiT
is a fairly new method that facilitates the examination of
treatment effects across an intervention or event that
occurs in time. It is appropriate when randomization is
infeasible and uses a quasi-experimental pre- and posttest approach to establish the causal effects of
interventions. By comparing observations lying closely
on either side of an assigned cut-off, it is possible to
estimate the average effect of the intervention. RDiT is
not constrained by unobservables that can affect the
outcome variable, as long as they do not change
discontinuously at the threshold [26]. Given its nonparametric nature, it also allows for the possibility of
uncovering heterogenous treatment effects by using a
local linear fit within each band, called bandwidth
[31][32]. The ability to set small bands allows for high
precision estimates as it will refit the regression each
time as you go away from the cutoff.
RDiT has been used to study the impact of
regulations on the marketplace, public transit strikes on
traffic congestion, promotions on economic activity,
and more [32][33][34]. Thus, RDiT models are well
suited to identify whether the targeted activity, in this
case M&As over time, responds to new information. In
our case, the intervention is the 1999 KPMG study and
the cut-off was therefore assigned at 1999. The model
was run separately for two dependent variables: value of
M&As (in billions of USD) and number of M&As. An
assumption of rationality (i.e. sensitivity to prior
probabilities) would create the expectation of a
treatment effect, or a change in M&A behavior, after the
cutoff of 1999, when decision makers have been
exposed to the published high failure rates [17].
We controlled for fluctuations in industry, GWP,
and recessions. Additionally, because the economic
control variables were only available from 1990 on, the
years of 1985 – 1989 were dropped, so that we would
have complete information for each observation. Given
the collinearity between the two economic covariates,
GWP and the recession indicator, we ran a factor
analysis for the discrete (GWP) and dichotomous
(recessions) variables that produced a single economic
covariate. The results of the factor analysis are shown in
Table 2. We also dropped the telecom industry variable
due to multicollinearity. This brought our total number

of observations down from N= 476 to N=405. Our two
RDiT models for value and count and a discussion of the
results are provided in Section 4.1.

Figure 4. Gross World Product in Billions (GWP) (1990
– 2018)
Table 2. Factor Analysis

3.2 Two-way Fixed Effects
Given the preliminary evidence for our hypothesis,
we sought to refine and validate our results. M&A
activity tends to be highly concentrated in places like
Europe and North America, and to a lesser degree, Asia.
After that there is a large drop off [28]. Additionally,
we tend to see M&A activity positively correlate with
the strength of economies around the world [35][36].
Hence, we significantly expanded our sample and also
controlled for economic strength and asymmetrical
concentration of M&A deal-making. So, in addition to
the treatment variable of interest (KPMG), and
companies that use KPMG as an auditor (KPMG as
auditor), we also added Country GDP by year (GDP),
region, industry, type of market (World (Developed) vs.
Emerging vs. Frontier), and deal status (completed vs
terminated).
We also wished to ensure that our results were not
an artifact of the particular econometric method we
used. Thus, we turned to a different type of analysis for
this much larger data set. This analysis was also
conducted with Stata software. Given the granular
nature of the Bloomberg data set, and the potential for
time and country (unit) variation, a two-way fixed
effects model is a great econometric tool to isolate
treatment effects given different baselines [37]. To get a
robust set of panels for our two-way fixed effects
analysis we needed to go through a lengthy process.
This lengthy, end-to-end process can be seen in Figure
5.
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Industries were consolidated from 23 to 10 based
on outlier groups that had fewer than 20 transactions and
could be reasonably associated with other industries.
We needed to create panel data that would be suitable
for our fixed effects models. There were many
transactions per day and some units had multiple
transactions in a single day. This motivated us to create
monthly panels. The data was collapsed by month and
country and dichotomous variables that existed for
individual transactions were converted to rolled up
numerical variables by specific month. This was done
for industry, region, type of market, deal status, and
KPMG auditor. Deal value was also summed up by
month and country so that one value would exist for
each unit in each time period. This gave us an N=3,797.

[46]. Our models for value and count and a discussion
of the results are provided in Section 4.2.

4. Results
4.1 Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT)
The analysis comprised of two models. Model 1
used the value of M&As per year (in billions of USD)
as its dependent variable and Model 2 used the total of
M&As per year as its dependent variable. The control
variables in both models were the industry dichotomous
variables and Factor1, which was a synthetic variable
made up of GWP and a recession indicator. Both models
can be seen below in Table 3.
Table 3. RDiT Models

Figure 5. Data processing for 152,590 M&A records
from Bloomberg

The data we used for this study came from a variety
of sources. The main source of data came from
Bloomberg Terminal (2020) and included all M&A
transactions, dates, countries, industry data, deal status
and deal value [40]. In addition to the core data set we
added GDP by year and country from the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
(2020) [38]. We were able to organize the countries by
region according to the MSCI classification Index, an
industry standard[39]. We also used the type of market
from MSCI (2020) to add another control variable.
Because we were specifically interested in the treatment
effect of whether decision makers were considering the
KPMG report in 1999 and the impact it may have had,
we added two variables related to this. One was a
dummy variable coded 0 prior to December of 1999 and
1 thereafter. Since the report was published in
November of 1999, this control variable tracked access
to the report. We also wanted to know if there was a
mitigating effect for clients who used KPMG as an
auditor, due to the fact that there may have been more
awareness regarding the report for KPMG clients. This
information was obtained from “Audit Opinions” from
the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) website

We first present the results for the value of M&As
(Model 1). The graphical representation (Figure 6) and
model (Table 4) show a fairly small (79.98 billion), but
statistically significant (z = 2.58) negative discontinuity
(reduction in value of M&As) after 1999. The value of
the coefficient represents the distance from the start of
the regression curve to the right of the cutoff, to the end
of the regression curve to the left of the cutoff. To check
the robustness of our results, we also conducted a
sensitivity analysis by removing the covariates (Figure
7; Table 6). The discontinuity remained negative but lost
some significance (z = 1.85) and shrank by about 34%
to 52.6 billion.

Figure 6. RDiT for M&As in Billions (USD)

The second analysis used the number of M&As per
year as the dependent variable. The graphical
representation (Figure 8) and model (Table 6) show a
large (- 492.04), but a highly statistically significant
positive discontinuity after 1999. This represents a sharp
increase in the number of M&As from 1999 to 2000. We
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also conducted a sensitivity analysis by removing the
covariates (Figure 9; Table 7). This created significant
issues with the findings. The prior bandwidth of 2.24
was no longer accepted by the software package, so it
was increased to 2.75. With the new bandwidth, the plot
looked fairly similar, but the RDiT model produced a
coefficient of 78.109 and all statistical significance was
lost (z = 1.1).

Table 6. RDiT for M&As in Numbers

Table 4. RDiT for M&As in Billions (USD)

Figure 9: Sensitivity Analysis - RDiT for M&As in
Numbers
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis - RDiT for M&As in
Numbers

Figure 7: Sensitivity Analysis - RDiT for M&As in
Billions (USD)
Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis - RDiT for M&As in Billions
(USD)

4.2 Two-way Fixed Effects

Figure 8: RDiT for M&As in Numbers

The monthly panels allow us to conduct analyses on
both value (Mvalueit) and count (Mcountit) of M&As by
regressing these dependent variables on the variables of
interest: (1) the availability of the KPMG report
(KPMGit), and (2) the number of times KPMG served as
auditor (KPMG as Auditorit), and control variables such
as the yearly GDP of that country in the current year
(GDPit), the yearly GDP of that country in the prior year
(GDPit-1) (separate models), the region of that country
(Regionit), the industry distribution of the deals in that
country for that month (Industry it), the deal status
distribution (completed or terminated) of the deals in
that country for that month (Deal Statusit), and the type
of market distribution of the deals in that country for that
month (Type of Marketit). Upon running the models,
records were eliminated for various missing values
which gave a final observation count of N=2,959 for
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current year GDP and N=2,174 for prior year GDP. The
4 models for value and count, regressed on current and
prior year GDP, can be seen in Table 8.
Table 8: Two-way Fixed Effects Models

Specifically, we used a two-way fixed effects
model with a unit and time fixed effect to control for
unobservables across countries (unit) and months
(time). The goal of this model is to reduce endogeneity
and tease out the true impact of new information to
M&A decision makers. We ran 8 distinct models which
produced standardized coefficients. For value as a
dependent variable (Mvalueit) we ran two models with
current year GDP (GDPit) and two with prior year GDP
(GDPit-1), varying standard errors between regular and
robust, since GDP can be a predictor of M&A activity,
but the reaction time is unclear [41]. We followed this
by doing the same for count (Mcountit), where α=unit
fixed effect and ϯ=time fixed effect. Note that B1=GDP
for country and month (current and prior year used in
distinct models), B2=Region of the Particular
Transaction, B3=Industry of the Acquiring Firm,
B4=Whether or not deal makers had access to the KPMG
Report (starting in December 1999 =1, =0 prior),
B5=Whether or not a deal was completed or terminated
at some point in the process, B6=Type of Market
according to MSCI (World, Emerging, or Frontier), and
B7= Whether or not KPMG was the Acquiring
company’s auditor.
In model 1a, we evaluated count as the dependent
variable with regular standard errors and current year
GDP. For industry, Utilities served as our baseline, for
markets, Frontier markets served as the baseline, and for
region, Asia served as the baseline in our models. For
all models, all coefficients positive or negative are
relative to the baseline variables in that grouping. In
model 1a we find that, controlling for factors previously
mentioned, deal makers were not dissuaded by the
KPMG report (variable of interest) stating that 83% of
M&As fail. The KPMG coefficient was a relatively
small negative (-.0012) and was not statistically
significant (p=.8). All industries were highly significant
with Financials being the largest statistically significant
positive influencer of number of deals (.1439***).
Communications was also a large influencer of number
of deals (.1281***). All regions were statistically
significant, three at the .01 level with North America
being the largest (.0442***). Current year GDP was
statistically significant (.0092***) as was Deal Status

(Completed) (.3518***). Type of Market was not
statistically significant. Interestingly, companies who
had KPMG as an auditor were more likely to be
impacted by the report (-.0004***), although this effect
size is small.
In model 1b, we evaluated count as the dependent
variable with robust standard errors and current year
GDP. In model 1b we also find that deal makers were
not dissuaded by the KPMG report (variable of interest).
The KPMG report remained statistically insignificant.
All industries remained highly significant, but all
regions lost their statistical significance in this model.
Current year GDP remained statistically significant as
did Deal Status (Completed). Type of Market was not
statistically significant. Companies who had KPMG as
an auditor remained statistically significant.
In model 2a, we evaluated count as the dependent
variable with regular standard errors but controlled for
prior year GDP instead of current year. In model 2a we
find that, controlling for factors previously mentioned,
deal makers were not dissuaded by the KPMG report
(variable of interest). The KPMG coefficient was a
relatively small negative (-.0012) and was not
statistically significant (p=.874). All industries were
highly significant with Financials being the largest
statistically significant positive influencer of number of
deals (.1400***). Communications was also a large
influencer of number of deals (.1251***). All regions
were statistically significant, three at the .01 level with
North America being the largest (.0457***). Current
year GDP was statistically significant at the .1 level
(.0092*) and Deal Status was highly significant
(Completed) (.3625***). Type of Market was not
statistically significant. Companies who had KPMG as
an auditor were more likely to be impacted by the report
(-.0045***).
In model 2b, we evaluated the same things as 2a
except we used robust standard errors. In model 2b we
find that, controlling for factors previously mentioned,
deal makers were not dissuaded by the KPMG report
(variable of interest). The KPMG coefficient was
relatively small and negative (-.0012) and was not
statistically significant (p=.874). All industries were
highly significant with Financials being the largest
statistically significant positive influencer of number of
deals (.1400***). Communications was also a large
influencer of number of deals (.1251***). All regions
were statistically significant, three at the .01 level with
North America being the largest (.0457***). Current
year GDP was statistically significant at the .1 level
(.0092*) and Deal Status was highly significant
(Completed) (.3625***). Type of Market was not
statistically significant. Companies who had KPMG as
an auditor were more likely to be impacted by the report
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(-.0045***). Model 1 and 2 standardized coefficients
and p-values are below in Table 9.
In model 3a, we evaluated M&A deal value as the
dependent variable with regular standard errors and
current year GDP. In model 3a we find that, controlling
for factors previously mentioned, deal makers were not
dissuaded by the KPMG report (variable of interest).
The KPMG coefficient was negative (-.016) and was not
statistically significant (p=.941). Four industries were
statistically significant, two highly significant,
Consumer Non-Cyclical (-.4307***) and Diversified (.0863***). For regions, only EMEA_CIS was
significant at the .05 level (.1218**). Current year GDP
was a statistically significant (-.8783***) negative
influencer of deal values. Deal Status was highly
positive influencer of deal values (Completed)
(1.273***). World (Type of Market) was also positive
(.9448***) and statistically significant. Companies who
had KPMG as an auditor were more likely to be
impacted by the report (-.1240***).
In model 3b, we evaluated M&A deal value as the
dependent variable with robust standard errors and
current year GDP. In model 3b we again find deal
makers were not dissuaded by the KPMG report
(variable of interest). The KPMG coefficient was not
statistically significant (p=.788). Only Diversified
remained highly significant for industry. Current year
GDP remained statistically significant (-.8783**) at the
.05 level. Deal Status lost statistical significance. World
(Type of Market) remained statistically significant.
Companies who had KPMG as an auditor remained
significant at the .05 level.
In model 4a, we evaluated M&A deal value as the
dependent variable with regular standard errors but
controlled for prior year GDP instead of current year. In
model 4a we find that, controlling for factors previously
mentioned, deal makers were not dissuaded by the
KPMG report (variable of interest). The KPMG
coefficient was negative (-.0224) and was not
statistically significant (p=.946). Three industries were
statistically significant, one highly significant,
Consumer Non-Cyclical (-.4240***). For regions, only
EMEA CIS was significant (.1989***). Prior year GDP
was a statistically significant (-1.3874***) negative
influencer of deal values. Deal Status was highly
positive influencer of deal values (Completed)
(1.094**). World (Type of Market) was also positive
(1.0411***) and statistically significant. Companies
who had KPMG as an auditor were more likely to be
impacted by the report (-.1284***).
In model 4b, we evaluated the same things as 4a
except we used robust standard errors. In model 4b we
again find deal makers were not dissuaded by the
KPMG report (variable of interest). The KPMG
coefficient was not statistically significant (p=.851).

Two industries were statistically significant, Consumer
Non-Cyclical and Diversified. For regions, EMEA CIS
remained highly significant. Prior year GDP also
remained highly significant. Deal Status lost statistical
significance. World (Type of Market) remained highly
significant. Companies who had KPMG as an auditor
remained highly significant at the .01 level. Model 3 and
4 standardized coefficients and p-values are in Table 10.
Table 9: Two-way Fixed Effects Model for Count

Table 10: Two-way Fixed Effects Model for Value

5. Conclusion & Discussion
Given the significant and high quality prior
probability that came to light in 1999 from KPMG, and
its extensive dissemination, we expected to see a
significant shift in behavior in the M&A evaluation
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process, and therefore a reduction in overall M&A
activity. Introducing an 83% failure rate as a prior
probability should substantially reduce future prospects
for success and thus prevent a number of M&As from
going forward, especially those expected to generate
only marginal gains. Yet two separate data sets and two
different methods appear to show a complete lack of
reaction to this ominous new data. It also helps explain
high persistent failure rates over decades in the face of
technology, data, process, and research evolution. One
interesting finding, however, was that for KPMG
clients, there was a mitigating effect. This would
suggest that greater awareness of the risks and expert
support to help people understand the importance of
prior probabilities, could nudge decision makers in the
right direction.
Although these results are not conclusive, they do
provide substantial evidence that there is a level of
insensitivity to prior probabilities in M&A evaluation,
and it is likely a reason failure rates remain extremely
high [5][6][7]. This is important not only for M&A
decision makers, but also for those who seek to design
decision support systems. Our analysis provides
preliminary empirical evidence of the harmful use of
heuristics in human judgement (i.e. ignoring prior
probabilities) in the context of SDM and a follow-up
study that examines this further is outlined in Section 6.

6. Limitations
There are a couple of limitations to this study that
we are looking to address with additional work on this
topic. First, cognitive biases occur at the individual
level, and our data is at the organizational level.
However, the heuristics used by individual managers
ultimately impact their organizational strategies and
outcomes. Thus, we ran a pilot study designed to
examine how individuals make decisions in M&A
scenarios using traditional factors and prior
probabilities. By varying the published failure rates in
the survey study, we are able to explore human
judgement under uncertainty and specifically examine
the sensitivity (or insensitivity) to prior probabilities at
the individual level. In this survey study we controlled
for demographics and based on the literature on
cognitive biases, we included independent variables on
the following: Need for Cognition [42], Cognitive
Reflection Test [43], and Impulsivity markers [43]. We
plan to follow up with a larger scale study that examines
human judgement in strategic decision making that will
allow us to more clearly demonstrate the impact of this
representativeness heuristic on M&A failures.
The second limitation is that this is a review of only
one cognitive bias, although one we believe the
evidence shows that it is highly impactful. There are
other cognitive biases that likely influence the process.

In decision making, parties required to make
judgements tend to conflate what is accurate or fair with
what provides the most benefit for that party. This is
called self-serving bias [44]. For example, if you are on
a management team and expect a promotion to come out
of an M&A that moves forward, that M&A is likely to
look more attractive to you than what the evidence
dictates (John Kelly, Partner, Head of Global Integration
and Separation Advisory for KPMG, personal
interview, May 18, 2020). Another example of a bias
that likely plays a role in M&As is the hot-hand fallacy.
If someone has had a few successes in a row, it is
believed that their next endeavor will be a success.
However, with this limited sample, it is more likely that
a few successes in a row is due to random chance rather
than being a predictor of future success, particularly if
those successes came in other types of endeavors [45].
More cognitive biases need further investigation as they
pertain to the M&A process so a more comprehensive
understanding can be developed.

7. References
[1] Chen, H., Chiang, R. H. L., & Storey, V. C. (2012).
Business Intelligence and Analytics: From Big Data to Big
Impact. MIS Quarterly. 36(4), 1165-1188. Retrieved from
https://ai.arizona.edu/sites/ai/files/MIS611D/chen-bidecember-2012.pdf
[2] Eisenhardt, K.M., & Zbaracki, M.J. (1992). Strategic
Decision Making. Strategic Management Journal, 13, 17-37.
[3] Vance, A. (2011, September 8). Data Analytics:
Crunching the Future. Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Retrieved
from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-0908/data-analytics-crunching-the-future
[4] PwC. (2016). PwC’s Global Data and Analytics Survey
2016. Retrieved from
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/advisory-services/datapossibilities/big-decision-survey.html
[5] KPMG. (1999). UNLOCKING SHAREHOLDER VALUE:
THE KEYS TO SUCCESS. Retrieved from
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/eqnotes/KPMG
M&A.pdf
[6] Christensen, C.M., Alton, R., Rising, C., & Waldeck, A.
(2011). The Big Idea: The New M&A Playbook. Harvard
Business Review. Retrieved from
https://hbr.org/2011/03/the-big-idea-the-new-ma-playbook
[7] Lewis, A., & McKone, D. (2016). So Many M&A Deals
Fail Because Companies Overlook This Simple Strategy.
Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from
https://hbr.org/2011/03/the-big-idea-the-new-ma-playbook
[8] Bauer, F., & Matzler, K. (2014). Antecedents of M&A
Success: The Role of Strategic Complementarity, Cultural
Fit, and Degree and Speed of Integration. Strategic
Management Journal, 35(2), 269-291.
[9] Bauer, F., & Matzler, K., & Wolf , S. (2016). M&A and
innovation: The role of integration and cultural differences:
A central European targets perspective. International
Business Review, 25, 76-86.

Page 5118

[10] Marks , M.L., & Marvis, P.H. (2011). Merge Ahead: A
Research Agenda to Increase Merger and Acquisition
Success. Journal of Business and Psychology, 26, 161-168.
[11] Baker, E.W., & Niederman , F. (2014). Integrating the
IS functions after mergers and acquisitions: Analyzing
business-IT alignment. Journal of Strategic Information
Systems 23 (2014) 112–127.
[12] Haleblian J, Kim J.Y., Rajagopalan N. (2006). The
influence of acquisition experience and performance on
acquisition behavior: evidence from the U.S. commercial
banking industry. Academy of Management Journal, 49(2),
357–370.
[13] Bruner, R.F. (2005). Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons
that Rise Above the Ashes. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
2005. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=720984
[14] Garzella, S., & Fiorentino , R. (2014). A synergy
measurement model to support the pre-deal decision making
in mergers and acquisitions. Management Decision, 52(6).
[15] Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. New
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
[16] Bingham, C.B. and Eisenhardt, K.M., 2011. Rational
heuristics: the ‘simple rules’ that strategists learn from
process experience. Strategic Management Journal, 32(13),
pp.1437-1464.
[17] Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982).
Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases.
Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press.
[18] Al Khars, M., Pavur, R., & Evangelopoulos, N. (2016).
“Insensitivity To Prior Probability,” Bias In Operations
Management Context. In SWDSI Proceedings, 411-419.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
[19] Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). A Subjective
Probability: A Judgement of Representativeness. Cognitive
Psychology, 3, 430-454.
[20] Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). Psychology of
prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237–251.
doi:10.1037/h0034747
[21] Bar-Hillel M. (1980). The base-rate fallacy in
probability judgments. Acta Psychological, 44(3):211–233.
[22] Montibeller, G., & von Winterfeldt, D. (2015).
Cognitive and Motivational Biases in Decision and Risk
Analysis. Risk Analysis, 35(7), 1230-1251.
[23] St. B.T. Evans, Jonathan. (1984). Heuristic and analytic
processes in reasoning. British Journal of Psychology,
75(451-468).
[24] Pennycook, G., Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., &
Thompson, V. A. (2013). Base Rates: Both Neglected and
Intuitive. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition. Advance online publication. doi:
10.1037/a0034887
[25] De Neys, W., & Glumicic, T. (2008). Conflict
monitoring in dual process theories of thinking. Cognition,
106, 1248 –1299. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.002
[26] Hausman, C., & Rapson, D. (2017). REGRESSION
DISCONTINUITY IN TIME:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS.
NBER, Working Paper 23602. Retrieved from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23602
[27] SBN Staff. (2018). What’s driving M&A deals and how
companies can capitalize on the activity. Smart Business.
Retrieved from

http://www.sbnonline.com/article/whats-driving-ma-dealsand-how-companies-can-capitalize-on-the-activity
[28] IMAA. (2020). M&A Statistics. Retrieved from
https://imaa-institute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics/
[29] Statista. (2018). Global gross domestic product (GDP) at
current prices from 2012 to 2022 (in billion U.S. dollars).
Retrieved from
https://www.statista.com/statistics/268750/global-grossdomestic-product-gdp/
[30] Lall, S. (2008). IMF Survey: IMF Predicts Slower
World Growth Amid Serious Market Crisis. IMF News.
Retrieved from
http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sores
040908a
[31] Fan, G. (1996). Local Polynomial Modelling and Its
Applications. London: Chapman and Hall.
[32] Auffhammer, M., & Kellogg, R. (2011). Clearing the
Air? The Effects of Gasoline Content Regulation on Air
Quality. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2687-2722.
[33] Anderson, M. L. (2014). Subways, Strikes, and
Slowdowns: The Impacts of Public Transition Traffic
Congestion. American Economic Review, 104(9), 2763-2796.
[34] Bento, A., Kaffine, D., Roth, K., & Zaragoza-Watkins,
M. (2014). The Effects of Regulation in the Presence of
Multiple Unpriced Externalities: Evidence from the
Transportation Sector. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 6(3), 1-29.
[35] Resende, M. (2008). Mergers and acquisitions waves in
the UK: a Markov-switching approach. Applied Financial
Economics, 18, 1067-1074.
[36] Choi, S., & Jeon, B. (2011). The impact of the
macroeconomic environment on merger activity: evidence
from US time-series data. Applied Financial Economics, 21,
233-249.
[37] Bailey, M. (2016). Real Stats: Using Econometrics for
Political Science and Public Policy. New York: Oxford
University Press.
[38] OECD. (2020). GDP by country and year 1994-2004.
Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domesticproduct-gdp.htm#indicator-chart
[39] MSCI. (2020). MSCI COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION
STANDARD. Retrieved from https://www.msci.com/marketclassification
[40] Bloomberg Terminal. (2020). Mergers and Acquisitions
1994-2004.
[41] Giovanni, J. (2005). What drives capital flows? The case
of cross-border M&A activity and financial deepening.
Journal of International Economics, 65, 127-149.
[42] Cacioppo, J., & Petty, R. (1984). The Efficient
Assessment of Need for Cognition. Journal of Personality
Assessment, 48(3), 306-307.
[43] Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive Reflection and Decision
Making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25-42.
[44] Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining
Bargaining Impasse: the Role of Self-Serving Biases. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 11(1): 109-26.
[45] Thaler, R, & Sunstein, C. (2009). Nudge. New York:
Penguin Books.
[46] Wharton. (2020). Audit Analytics – Audit Opinions.
Wharton Research Data Services. Retrieved from
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/

Page 5119

